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The Impact of CEO/CFO Outside Directorships on  
Auditor Selection and Audit Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: We examine whether Chief Executive Officer/Chief Financial Officer (CEO/CFO) 
outside directorships and resulting network ties to auditors affect auditor selection decisions and 
subsequent audit quality. The network ties arise when the CEO/CFO of a firm (home firm) serves 
as an outside director of another firm that hires an auditor (connected auditor). Using a sample of 
firms that switch auditors over the period 2003-2012, we find that home firms are more likely to 
appoint connected auditors. We also find that home firms hiring connected auditors experience a 
significant decline in subsequent audit quality, compared to those hiring non-connected auditors. 
Specifically, the likelihood of misstatements, the propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, 
and the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals increase after home firms appoint connected 
auditors, compared to other firms switching to non-connected auditors. We further show that the 
negative effect of hiring connected auditors on subsequent audit quality is more pronounced when 
the connection is via the same auditor office or audit committee membership.  
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1. Introduction 
This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer or Chief Financial Officer (CEO/CFO) 
outside directorships and resulting network ties to auditors affect auditor selection decisions, and 
how the appointment of such networked auditors influences subsequent audit quality. Senior 
executives of other firms are preferred candidates for independent outside directors because of 
their strategic leadership and finance/accounting expertise. Despite this preference, there is little 
consensus on whether such outside directorships are beneficial or harmful to their home firms. 
While some studies suggest that executives’ outside board directorship is related to managerial 
opportunism and entrenchment (Davis 1991; Zajac and Westphal 1996), others argue that it can 
enhance the home firm’s ability to obtain critical information and resources (Bacon and Brown 
1975; Fahlenbrach et al. 2010).1 Our study provides a unique setting to test these two different 
views in the context of audits. On the one hand, executives may prefer to hire their networked 
auditors because their pre-existing relationship can potentially lower uncertainty related to auditor 
switch and thus improve audit quality. On the other hand, executives may use the connection to 
appoint a “cozy” auditor and to exert influence over auditor independence. Therefore, it is an open 
empirical question how executives’ network ties to auditors through outside directorships affect 
auditor selection decisions and subsequent audit quality.  
Prior studies examine the effect of network ties between executives and auditors via common 
education or prior employment at audit firms on audit outcomes (e.g., Menon and Williams 2004; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2015; Guan et al. 2016).2 Distinct from these studies, we focus on a network tie 
                                           
1  Geletkanycz and Boyd (2011) and Ruigrok et al. (2006) call these two views “the agency view” and “the 
embeddedness view,” respectively. We follow these studies and use the same terms. 
2 While these studies examine the effect of network ties that were developed in the past, our study focuses on current 
and ongoing ties that can affect auditors’ economic incentives. When auditors challenge a client’s management on 
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that arises when the CEO/CFO of a firm (home firm) serves as an outside director of another firm 
(connected firm) that hires an auditor (connected auditor).3 We call this relationship CEO/CFO-
auditor interlocks.4 A network tie is naturally established when the CEO/CFO serves on the audit 
committee (AC) of the connected firm because of the interactions with the auditor for accounting 
and auditing issues. Even when the CEO/CFO does not serve on the AC, a network tie can be built 
because of common acquaintance with AC members and the auditor’s liaison with the board of 
directors (BOD) to discuss important agendas (Cohen et al. 2007). While the CEO/CFO outside 
directorship provides an important opportunity to learn about an auditor and to build a connection, 
the implication of such a connection for auditor appointment decision and subsequent audit 
outcome has not been explored in prior studies.  
Extant literature proposes two theories, embeddedness and agency views, with respect to 
executive outside directorship and its contribution to the home firms (e.g., Ruigrok et al. 2006; 
Shropshire 2010; Geletkanycz and Boyd 2011). Under the embeddedness view, the CEO/CFOs 
with outside directorships may prefer to hire a connected auditor through their network ties 
because their familiarity with the auditor can reduce the uncertainty of an incoming auditor and 
                                           
financial reporting issues, they bear a risk of losing a client. Whereas auditors in our setting take a risk of losing more 
than one client (home and connected firms), such imminent economic pressures do not exist in the setting of audit 
firm alumni or school ties.  
3 Among senior executives, we examine the interlocking of CEO/CFO for the following reasons. First, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 recognizes the role of the two executives in financial reporting by requiring them to certify the 
fairness of their financial statements. Second, the two executives still influence auditor selection decisions, even 
though SOX mandates that the audit committee (AC) be directly responsible for appointment and oversight of auditors 
(Cohen et al. 2010a; Fiolleau et al. 2013; Dhaliwal et al. 2015) and that auditors also perceive that CEO/CFOs have 
powers to switch auditors with little friction with the AC (Gendron and Bedard 2006). Third, the AC often interacts 
with the CEO/CFO. CFOs attend most AC meetings, and in some cases, CEOs also attend the meetings. Thus, the two 
executives have more influence over audit-related matters and financial reporting than other senior executives. 
4  We use the terms CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks, network ties, or connections interchangeably to indicate this 
relationship. Since the identity of the audit engagement partner is not publicly disclosed in the U.S. during our sample 
period, we are unable to measure network ties of audit partners. Due to this drawback, we operationalize the network 
ties between CEO/CFOs and auditors at the firm level (in lieu of the partner level) through outside directorships. 
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improve communication and working relationship.5 Even under the agency view, the CEO/CFOs 
can still prefer hiring a connected auditor because, by appointing the connected auditor, they could 
influence auditor hiring, retention, firing, and compensation decisions in both home and connected 
firms. This, in turn, could allow them to exercise a greater bargaining power over the connected 
auditor and to increase the chances of more lenient audit judgments. Taken together, we predict 
that the presence of CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks will increase the likelihood that the home firm 
hires a connected auditor when the firm switches its auditor. 
It is ex ante unclear, however, in which direction hiring a connected auditor will affect the 
subsequent audit quality for the home firm. The embeddedness view implies that it has a positive 
impact on audit quality because appointing an acquainted auditor improves communication and 
facilitates information transfers between client and auditor. In contrast, the agency view suggests 
that the interlocking relationship can pose a threat to auditor independence due to the increased 
power of CEO/CFOs over the connected auditor, which can negatively affect subsequent audit 
quality. Collectively, we hypothesize the impact of an appointment of a connected auditor on 
subsequent audit quality as two competing predictions. 
To test these predictions empirically, we first identify auditor switching firms from Audit 
Analytics database and then collect data for CEO/CFOs’ board interlocks from BoardEx database, 
which covers most public firms in the U.S. Our sample consists of 597 firms that switched to Big 
4 auditors over the period 2003–2012. Consistent with our prediction, we find that firms whose 
CEO/CFOs have network ties via outside directorships are more likely to appoint connected 
auditors. For instance, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) is more likely to be appointed as a new 
                                           
5 Furthermore, the likelihood of appointing a connected auditor can be higher when the auditor exhibits superior audit 
quality at the connected firm. We examine this possibility in a later section. 
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auditor for firms whose CEO/CFO serves as an outside director of another firm that currently hires 
PwC, relative to other Big 4 firms. We find similar results for other Big 4 auditors. Next, using a 
difference-in-differences research design, we find that hiring the connect auditors impairs the 
subsequent audit quality. Specifically, home firms hiring the connected auditors are more likely to 
misstate their financial statements, meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts and zero earnings, 
and report greater absolute discretionary accruals, subsequent to auditor changes, than firms 
switching to non-connected auditors. These findings remain unchanged even when we use the 
propensity score matching approach to control for potential self-selection bias. Collectively, our 
findings suggest that CEO/CFO outside directorships increase the likelihood of hiring a connected 
auditor, thereby resulting in a deterioration in audit quality. Furthermore, our results show that the 
impaired audit quality is more pronounced when the ties are developed through either the same 
office or AC membership than when the ties are developed through the same audit firm (but not 
the same office) and merely board interlocks. Finally, we provide evidence that the connected 
auditors receive abnormally higher fees from both home and connected firms after the home firm 
hires the connected auditors. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study adds to the literature 
on the effects of top executives’ outside directorship on home firms. While existing studies 
examine this issue in the areas of firm performance, corporate governance, CEO compensation, 
performance of mergers, and sensitivity of CEO turnover-to-performance (e.g., Geletkanycz et al. 
2001; Fich 2005; Balsmeier et al. 2011; Geletkanycz and Boyd 2011; El-Khatib et al. 2015), to the 
best of our knowledge, no research has explored the effect in the context of auditing. Our results 
indicate that hiring a connected auditor via the executives’ outside directorship can undermine 
external monitoring, which is a potential cost to the home firm.  
5 
Second, while prior studies examine the determinants of hiring a Big 4 or industry specialist 
auditor, a scarce amount of research has explored auditor choice decisions among Big 4 auditors. 
Our study contributes to the literature by documenting that CEO/CFO-auditor network ties through 
outside directorships significantly affect auditor selections within Big 4 auditors.  
Third, our study extends audit research by examining the effect of CEO/CFO-auditor 
interlocks on audit quality, which is notably absent in the literature. The literature on the role of 
networks in financial reporting is growing, but related audit research has focused only on the 
effects of audit firm alumni affiliation (e.g., Lennox 2005), AC director-CEO ties (e.g., Bruynseels 
and Cardinaels 2014), or AC director-auditor interlocks (Chen et al. 2014). Moreover, the mixed 
evidence from these studies highlights the need for further research.6 Our study complements prior 
studies by documenting that CEO/CFOs influence auditor selection decisions to hire connected 
auditors and that hiring such auditors impairs subsequent audit quality.  
Our study provides regulatory insights into CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks. While the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires a one-year cooling-off period before an audit firm 
employee accepts an executive position at a former client, our findings suggest that another form 
of client-auditor ties can also impair audit quality. Given the downside of the CEO/CFO-auditor 
interlocks on audit quality, regulators may consider developing mechanisms that discourage clients’ 
opportunistic auditor switches, such as mandated disclosure of any existing CEO/CFO-auditor 
interlocks, especially when the relationship is via AC membership or the same audit office.  
In Section 2, we discuss prior literature and develop hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
                                           
6 For example, while Lennox (2005) suggests that audit quality is impaired when client executives are affiliated with 
auditors, Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) find that professional and school ties between CEO and AC directors do 
not hamper the quality of the AC’s oversight. Chen et al. (2014) also find that investors’ perception of earnings quality 
measured by earnings response coefficients increases with AC director-auditor interlocks. 
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sample selection and research design. We discuss the empirical results in Section 4 and conclude 
in Section 5. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Social and professional networks of corporate stakeholders  
Social capital theory predicts that social and professional ties between individuals affect their 
behavior and economic outcomes (e.g., Granovetter 2005). A stream of literature examines various 
ties between executives and non-executive directors and generally finds that the connections result 
in weak corporate governance and poor financial reporting quality (Hwang and Kim 2009; Fracassi 
and Tate 2012; Bruynseels and Cardinaels 2014).7  Another line of research examines social 
networks with external parties, such as analysts and fund managers. Contrary to above-mentioned 
studies, these studies find that such social connections improve the external parties’ decision 
making by facilitating efficient information transfers (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2010b; 
Engelberg et al. 2012).8   
In audit research, while several studies explore how network ties between client firm 
executives and auditors affect audit outcomes, the evidence concentrates on the effect of audit firm 
alumni affiliation, where an audit firm employee joins one of the auditor’s client firms (alma mater 
affiliation). For example, Lennox (2005) and Menon and Williams (2004) find that firms with alma 
                                           
7 Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) find that, while professional and school ties between CEOs and AC members do 
not hamper the AC’s oversight quality, nonprofessional social ties such as shared leisure clubs lead to greater earnings 
management. Fracassi and Tate (2012) find that ties between board members and CEO weaken the monitoring 
effectiveness and reduce firm value. Hwang and Kim (2009) document that CEOs with socially connected boards 
receive higher compensation and exhibit weaker pay-performance and turnover-performance sensitivities.  
8 For example, Cohen et al. (2008) find that fund managers with school ties place greater bets on connected firms and 
their portfolios of connected firms exhibit superior performance. Engelberg et al. (2012) show that school or 
professional ties between managers of banks and borrowing firms improve information flow and lending efficiency. 
Cohen et al. (2010b) find that analysts with school ties have higher performance of stock recommendation.  
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mater officers are less likely to receive going concern opinions and tend to report higher absolute 
discretionary accruals, respectively, consistent with the view that auditor alumni affiliation harms 
auditor independence.9 Lennox and Park (2007) show that firms with affiliated officers are more 
likely to hire their alma mater as an auditor in the pre-SOX period and that effective AC moderates 
this likelihood. Extending the sample to the post-SOX period, Dhaliwal et al. (2015) report that 
affiliated officers continue to affect the appointment of their alma mater but show that such hiring 
does not lead to impaired auditor independence in the post-SOX period. Guan et al. (2016) examine 
how school ties between auditors and client executives affect audit quality and audit fees, using 
Chinese data where the identity of signing audit partners is disclosed. They find that the school 
ties impair audit quality while increasing audit fees, suggesting that Chinese auditors tend to 
compromise their independence in the presence of school ties.  
An alternative channel for client-auditor networks is director/executive-auditor interlocks, 
as in our setting. Recently, Lennox and Yu (2016) find that firms tend to hire audit firms with 
whom directors and executives of home firms are acquainted through their service on the boards 
of other firms and that the tenure of auditors hired from such connections is longer than that of 
other auditors.10 Relying on the interlocks between AC directors and auditors, Chen et al. (2014) 
                                           
9 On the contrary, Geiger et al. (2008) find a positive market reaction to firms hiring alma mater officers, suggesting 
that this hiring practice is not necessarily value-destroying. Furthermore, Naiker and Sharma (2009) and Naiker et al. 
(2013) find that the presence of a former audit partner on the AC reduces internal control deficiencies and earnings 
management, and non-audit services procured from the auditor, respectively, suggesting that AC monitoring improves 
with the presence of an alma mater independent director. 
10 Lennox and Yu (2016) find that hiring those auditors is weakly associated with higher audit quality. We note that 
the roles and incentives of outside directors are quite different from those of executives. Executives are directly 
responsible for firm performance, while outside directors’ main responsibilities are monitoring and advising 
executives. Lennox and Yu (2016)’s weak results on audit quality may come from examining the interlocks of 
executives and outside directors together, despite their different roles and incentives. Moreover, prior studies find 
contrasting effects of auditors’ professional ties to executives (Lennox 2005) and to outside directors (Chen et al. 2014) 
on audit quality. Our additional analysis, discussed in the later section, also indicates that AC-auditor ties through 
outside directorship do not affect auditor choice decisions or audit quality. Given that CEO/CFOs and outside directors 
take different roles and incentives, we believe that our focus on CEO/CFO-auditor network ties better identifies top 
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find that earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are higher for firms with the interlocks, suggesting 
that investors’ perception of earnings quality increases with AC director-auditor interlocks.  
2.2. Embeddedness and agency views 
There are two theories on executives’ outside board service and its contribution to their home 
firm: embeddedness and agency views (Ruigrok et al. 2006; Shropshire 2010; Geletkanycz and 
Boyd 2011). The embeddedness view argues that a corporate leader is influenced by relations to 
other leaders and by the structure of the network of relations such as board interlocks, and that 
such relations provide an important source of information and communication. Under this view, 
outside directorships are considered beneficial to the home firms because they afford access to 
important policies and practices of other firms, which in turn helps the executives to manage their 
home firms successfully. For instance, executives sitting on outside boards can learn about 
different management styles or strategies used in other firms (Booth and Deli 1996; Beckman and 
Haunschild 2002). Also, they can learn alternative approaches and strategies without incurring the 
costs of experimentation to their home firms (Burt 1987). Sitting on other boards also enables 
executives to establish a network with other directors (Fahlenbrach et al. 2010). Bacon and Brown 
(1975) summarize the potential benefits of executives’ outside directorships as follows: (a) 
Benchmarking of others, (b) exposure to innovation, (c) obtaining information, (d) exposure to 
alternative management systems, and (e) receiving counsel. 
Alternatively, the agency view suggests that, although executives enjoy financial benefits 
and other perquisites from outside directorships, little utility is accrued to their home firms (Davis 
1991; Berger et al. 1997). Rather, it argues that multiple directorships are an indicator of personal 
                                           
executives’ motives for hiring connected auditors.  
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prestige and power. Consistent with this perspective, prior literature shows that top executives who 
hold outside directorships tend to be more powerful in board decisions and thus in a better position 
to entrench themselves and to behave opportunistically. For instance, executives receive numerous 
rewards from outside directorships, including board pay and pension (Yermack 2004), as well as 
elevated prestige and standing in social circles (Useem 1984). This elevated professional standing 
enables the executives to demand higher pay at home firms (Zajac and Westphal 1996) and to 
exercise greater intra-organizational power (Frankelstein 1992), which increases the possibility of 
managerial entrenchment. Consistent with this possibility, studies find that top executives’ outside 
board ties are associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance (Balsmeier 
et al. 2011), value-destroying mergers (El-Khatib et al. 2015), and adoptions of golden parachutes 
(Wade et al. 1990) and poison pills (Davis 1991), all of which protect managers’ interests at the 
expense of shareholders. Together, these studies suggest that outside directorship not only distracts 
executives from their internal duties but also advances the executives’ personal interests at the 
expense of those of the home firm and its shareholders.   
2.3. Hypotheses development 
When the CEO/CFO of a home firm serves on the AC of another firm (connected firm), the 
executive has opportunities to build network ties to the connected firm’s auditor (connected auditor) 
and to assess the auditor’s audit quality because the AC members frequently interact with the 
auditor to discuss important accounting and auditing issues. Auditors also liaise with BOD 
members to discuss critical issues such as financial distress, restructuring, and internal controls 
(Cohen et al. 2007), and interact through their common acquaintances with AC members (Cai and 
Sevilir 2012; Chiu et al. 2013). Thus, executives with such a network have opportunities to learn 
about the connected firm’s auditor, audit practice, and audit quality.  
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According to the embeddedness view, the CEO/CFO’s board networks could enable the 
home firm to make a more informed auditor selection decision because the CEO/CFO with such 
an interlocking relationship has good knowledge about the connected auditor through observations 
and interactions, thereby reducing the uncertainty of a new auditor. Moreover, given the pre-
existing knowledge and working experience, the CEO/CFO will be able to communicate more 
effectively and establish a better working relationship with the connected auditor, which has been 
argued as one of the most important factors in determining the choice of auditor (Beattie and 
Fearnley 1995; Eichenseher and Shields 1983).11 If this is the case, the home firm may prefer to 
hire the connected auditor instead of other auditors.  
Under the agency view, the CEO/CFO may use the connection to appoint a cozy auditor who 
can provide more lenient audit judgments. By hiring the connected auditor, the CEO/CFO could 
exercise greater bargaining power over the auditor because the CEO/CFO can exert influence on 
auditor hiring, retention, firing, and compensation decisions in both home and connected firms. In 
particular, prior studies suggest that CEOs of other firms maintain elevated status among 
independent directors and thus have greater clout than other directors in making board- or 
committee-level decisions (Fich 2005; Erkens and Bonner 2013). The elevated status of 
CEO/CFOs empowers them to exercise more influence over the AC’s perception of the auditor, 
even though each has just one vote on the board or AC at the connected firm. Thus, the CEO/CFOs 
may prefer to choose connected auditors to the extent that they expect to exert influence over the 
                                           
11 In addition, McCracken et al. (2008) show that, when audit firms assign their audit partners, they consider client 
CFOs’ preferences for certain partners, suggesting that the relationship between client CFO and audit partner is 
important for auditing.  
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connected auditor when resolving important issues in auditor-client contracting and audit 
adjustments for their home firms. 
Although those incentives exist, SOX mandated that ACs be directly responsible for 
appointment and oversight of auditors. If SOX is effective in removing CEO/CFO influence over 
auditor selection, no relationship between CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks and auditor selection will 
be observed, especially when the CEO/CFO’s preference for the connected auditor is attributable 
to the agency view. In contrast, if the AC members of the home firm largely support hiring auditors 
preferred by the CEO/CFO, the interlocks may affect the selection of the connected auditor. Prior 
research finds evidence consistent with this view. For instance, Gendron and Bedard (2006) 
suggest that AC members normally do not resist when management does not want to renew the 
incumbent auditor. Other studies also report managers influencing auditor selection and retention 
decisions after SOX (Cohen et al. 2010a; Fiolleau et al. 2013; Dhaliwal et al. 2015). Beck and 
Mauldin (2014) also find that, even after SOX, CFOs significantly influence audit fee decisions. 
These results raise doubt about the effectiveness of SOX with respect to controlling management 
influence over audit-related matters. Therefore, we predict that CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks 
increase the likelihood that the home firm hires a connected auditor. We posit the following 
hypothesis in an alternative form: 
H1: A home firm is more likely to appoint a connected auditor when the firm switches its 
auditor. 
 
When the home firm switches to a connected auditor, it is unclear how the CEO/CFO-auditor 
interlocking relation affects subsequent audit quality. The embeddedness theory suggests that the 
relation could have a positive impact on audit quality because of effective communication and 
information transfers between auditor and client. Prior research also suggests that network ties 
12 
among economic agents improve information transfer and reduce costs of gathering information 
(Cai and Sevilir 2012; Engelberg et al. 2012). As such, the connected auditor has better access to 
information about managers and their reporting incentives, which in turn helps the auditor to 
identify audit risk and resolve potential problems in a timely manner. Moreover, the connected 
auditor will be able to better understand the clients’ business model and future plans, details of 
transactions and accounts, and the internal control system. This will allow the auditor to plan and 
organize the audit process in more effective ways, thereby improving audit quality.  
Alternatively, the CEO/CFO-auditor networks may pose a threat to auditor independence 
under the agency view. As discussed earlier, hiring a connected auditor may provide the CEO/CFO 
with greater bargaining power over the auditor because the officer can affect audit engagements 
for both home and connected firms. DeAngelo (1981) shows that auditors have incentives to retain 
economically important clients. In our setting, auditors may perceive the interlocked CEO/CFOs 
as more powerful and economically important due to their ability to exert influence over auditor 
retention and audit fee decisions in both home and connected firms. In fact, existing literature 
shows the evidence of client bargaining power influencing auditor behavior. For example, auditors 
are less likely to issue a going concern opinion and are more likely to waive proposed audit 
adjustments for larger clients (McKeown et al. 1991; Nelson et al. 2002). These studies suggest 
that the connected auditor can be more susceptible to the CEO/CFO’s pressure to obtain preferred 
audit outcomes, thereby inducing lower audit quality.12 
                                           
12  It is possible that the connected auditor is unwilling to compromise independence, despite the CEO/CFO’s 
bargaining power, given that SOX implemented numerous steps to improve audit quality and auditor independence. 
Moreover, the newly created PCAOB increased both oversight and penalties for audit-related deficiencies. Under this 
possibility, the CEO/CFO’s great bargaining power may not result in lowered audit quality. 
13 
Moreover, the network ties between the CEO/CFO and auditor could create homophily (i.e., 
mutual affinity) and favoritism bias (i.e., tendency to interpret connected others’ intentions and 
actions favorably) (Tajifel and Turner 1986; McPherson et al. 2001; Guan et al. 2016). The 
homophily theory argues that frequent interactions between people tend to develop ties and create 
mutual caring and trust (Silver 1990; Pelled et al. 1999; McPherson et al. 2001). In the context of 
audit, the connections with the CEO/CFO may induce the auditor to overestimate the 
trustworthiness of the CEO/CFO and to be less skeptical about management representation 
(Nelson 2009). The lowered professional skepticism may result in a less objective audit risk 
assessment and insufficient substantive tests, adversely affecting audit quality. This view is 
consistent with prior evidence that audit firm alumni affiliation negatively affects audit quality 
(Menon and Williams 2004; Lennox 2005).  
Taken together, the appointment of a connected auditor can either improve or impair the 
subsequent audit quality for the home firm. Therefore, we develop the following two competing 
hypotheses:  
H2a: Hiring a connected auditor improves subsequent audit quality. 
H2b: Hiring a connected auditor impairs subsequent audit quality. 
 
3. Sample selection and research design 
3.1. Measuring CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks 
To measure CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks, we first identify CEO/CFOs and their outside 
directorships using the BoardEx database. 13  To comprehensively identify CEO/CFO outside 
                                           
13 From the BoardEx database, CEOs are identified based on the following titles: CEO, acting CEO, interim CEO, 
co-CEO, group CEO, chief executive (officer), group chief executive (officer), company leader, and group leader. 
Similarly, CFOs are identified based on the following titles: CFO, acting CFO, co-CFO, interim CFO, group CFO, 
CFO (part-time), chief financial/finance (officer), and principal financial/finance (officer).  
14 
directorships and to focus on the current post-SOX regime, we limit our sample period to 2003–
2012.14 We then collect each firm’s auditor identity from Audit Analytics. When a CEO/CFO 
serves as an outside director of another firm hiring a certain auditor, the CEO/CFO is considered 
to have network ties to the auditor. If a CEO/CFO serves on the boards of multiple firms that hire 
different auditors, the CEO/CFO is treated as having network ties to each of those auditors.15  
3.2. Sample selection 
The sample selection procedure for auditor choice analysis is outlined in Table 1. Starting 
from an intersection of Compustat and Audit Analytics from 2003 through 2012, our initial sample 
consists of 1,157 firm-year observations that switched to Big 4 auditors. We limit the sample to 
firms switching to Big 4 auditors to make our sample firms more homogenous. Furthermore, since 
very few observations are tied to non-Big 4 auditors, it would be difficult to implement our auditor 
choice analysis for non-Big 4 auditors. We then eliminate 163 observations with missing SIC codes 
from Compustat and 189 observations in financial services industries (SIC codes 6000–6999). We 
also drop 166 observations that are not covered by BoardEx. Finally, we remove 42 observations 
due to a missing value on any of the control variables for auditor selection analysis. Accordingly, 
we are left with 597 observations switching to Big 4 auditors.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                           
14 BoardEx provides biographical information about senior managers and board members. The database started to 
collect the information in 2003, backfilling data to 2000. In 2005, BoardEx carried out a major extension of its 
coverage, backfilling data to 2003, which substantially increased the coverage. Our exploration of the database reveals 
that the number of U.S. firms covered by BoardEx increased from 2,028 in 2002 to 4,154 in 2003. Its coverage 
gradually increases in subsequent years, providing data for more than 5,000 firms annually for recent years. Despite 
the extended coverage, we might fail to identify some CEO/CFOs’ external directorships because BoardEx does not 
cover all public firms in the U.S. However, this failure is likely to bias against our findings. 
15 Among 597 auditor switching firms in the final sample, we find that the CEO/CFOs of 412 firms do not serve as 
outsider directors of any firms covered by BoardEx. The CEO/CFOs of 130 firms serve as outside directors of only 
one firm in the BoardEx universe. The CEO/CFOs of 41 (10, 2, 2) firms have two (three, four, five) external 
directorships, so that some of them have connections to more than one audit firm. 
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To test the impact of hiring connected auditors on subsequent audit quality, we implement a 
difference-in-differences research design. In detail, we compare the change in audit quality from 
the pre- to post-auditor-switch periods for firms switching from a non-connected auditor to a 
connected one (i.e., treatment firms), to the change for other firms switching from a non-connected 
auditor to another non-connected one (i.e., control firms). We employ three proxies for audit 
quality: restatements, meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (analysts’ consensus forecasts and 
zero earnings), and absolute discretionary accruals. For each treatment and control firm, we retain 
two-year observations immediately before and after auditor change, respectively. To test with 
balanced panel data, if any of the required variables during the four consecutive years for a firm 
are missing, all observations of the firm are dropped.16 After applying these criteria, our sample 
for audit quality analysis consists of 1,352, 472, 1,352, and 1,044 firm-year observations from 338, 
118, 338, and 261 unique firm-year observations for the tests with restatements, meeting/beating 
analysts’ consensus forecasts, zero earnings, and absolute discretionary accruals, respectively. 
3.3. Research design 
3.3.1. Auditor selection model 
To investigate whether auditor switching firms are more likely to appoint a connected auditor 
among the Big 4, we estimate the following logistic model for each of Big 4 auditors, adapted from 
Dhaliwal et al. (2015) and Lennox and Park (2007):17 
XX = α0 + α1 ConnXX + α2 FBig4+ α3 MatchXX + α4 SpecXX + α5 AlumniXX + α6 ACsize  
+ α7 ACexpertise + ε           (1) 
                                           
16 Our results are qualitatively similar when we use unbalanced panel data without this restriction. 
17 We omit firm and year subscripts for conciseness in all models.  
16 
where the dependent variable XX is an indicator variable equal to one if the incoming auditor is 
XX, and zero otherwise, where XX is PwC, EY, Deloitte, or KPMG. For example, PwC is equal 
to one if the firm appoints PwC as its new auditor and zero if the firm appoints one of the other 
three auditors. Our variable of interest, ConnXX, is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
CEO/CFO of the firm serves as an independent director of another firm who hires the auditor XX, 
and zero otherwise.18 Our H1 predicts α1 > 0. 
Following prior research, we control for several factors that may influence firms’ auditor 
selection. FBig4 is an indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor auditor was a Big 4 auditor, 
and zero otherwise. MatchXX is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is better matched 
with XX than with any of the other Big 4 auditors, and zero otherwise, which is estimated based 
on Lennox and Park (2007)'s clientele match model. SpecXX is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the auditor XX has the largest market share of audit fees in the industry-year cohort to which the 
given client belongs, and zero otherwise. AlumniXX is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
CEO, CFO, or Chief Accounting Officer (CAO) formerly worked for the auditor XX, and zero 
otherwise. ACsize is the number of directors on the audit committee. Finally, ACexpertise is an 
indicator variable equal to one if audit committee includes at least one accounting expert, and zero 
otherwise. 
3.3.2.  Audit quality models 
Following a comprehensive review of DeFond and Zhang (2014), we use three commonly 
used proxies for audit quality: restatements, meeting/beating earnings benchmarks, and 
                                           
18 Note that firms currently hiring XX (e.g., PwC) are not able to switch to XX (e.g., PwC). Thus, we estimate Eq. (1) 
after dropping firms whose predecessor auditor corresponds to XX. For example, to test whether firms with CEO/CFO-
PwC ties are more likely to appoint PwC, we estimate the model with 461 auditor-switching firms after removing 136 
firms whose incumbent auditor was PwC (597 – 136 = 461). 
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discretionary accruals. These proxies capture complementary dimensions of audit quality, such as 
both egregious audit failures and mild “within GAAP” earnings management, and both discrete 
and continuous measures. 19  We obtain inferences from these multiple proxies because each 
measure has both weaknesses and strengths (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) find that auditors’ preference for conservative accounting 
is systematically associated with discretionary accruals in pre- and post-auditor-switch periods. 
Shu (2000) also argues that auditor changes are associated with increased auditor litigation risk 
and client financial distress, which could bias our audit quality tests if we perform tests only with 
the sample of firms that switch to connected auditors. To mitigate these concerns, we employ a 
difference-in-differences research design using firms switching from non-connected auditors to 
connected ones as treatment firms, and firms switching from non-connected auditors to non-
connected ones as control firms.20 Since the changes in audit quality for control firms are used to 
capture common auditor change effects, the difference in the changes between treatment and 
control firms is regarded as the incremental effect of hiring connected auditors over the common 
effects. 
Our first proxy for audit quality is the likelihood of restating financial statements. 
Restatements are direct and egregious measures of audit quality because they indicate that the 
previously reported financial statements were unreliable and that auditors failed to correct the 
                                           
19 Another popular measure of audit quality is the auditor’s propensity to issue going-concern opinions. We are unable 
to employ this measure because all firms switching to a connected auditor in our sample receive a clean audit opinion 
for both pre- and post-auditor-switch periods. 
20 Among 597 auditor switching firms, 73 (486) firms switched from a non-connected auditor to a connected (non-
connected) auditor, forming our treatment (control) group. These sample sizes are greater than those of Dhaliwal et al. 
(2015), who find that, among 420 post-SOX Big 4 appointments, 52 (368) firms switched to an affiliated (non-
affiliated) auditor. Note that we exclude 33 (5) firms that switched from a connected auditor to a non-connected 
(another connected) auditor from our audit quality test samples to obtain clean treatment and control firms. Since the 
number of these firms is too small, we could not implement meaningful tests for the changes in audit quality. 
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misstatements. Thus, if hiring connected auditors leads to lower (higher) audit quality, firms 
appointing such auditors are more (less) likely to misstate financial statements and thus issue 
restatements in a subsequent period. To test this prediction, we estimate the following logistic 
model adapted from Francis et al. (2013): 
Restatement (or DecRestatement) = β0 + β1 Post + β2 Treat + β3 Post * Treat 
+ β4 LogTA + β5 ROA + β6 Market-to-Book + β7 Leverage + β8 Issue  
+ β9 NonAuditFeeRatio + β10 MSALeader + β11 NationalLeader + β12 Cimportance  
+ β13 Big4 + β14 AlumniAud + β15 CEOisChair + β16 BDindep  
+ β17 ACsize + β18 ACexpertise + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε     (2) 
 
where Restatement (DecRestatement) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm-year 
financial statements are misstated and thus subsequently restated (the earnings for the firm-year 
are overstated and thus subsequently restated downward), and zero otherwise. 21  Treat is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm switches to a connected auditor, and zero otherwise. 
Firms switching from a non-connected auditor to a connected auditor comprise treatment firms 
(Treat = 1), while firms switching from a non-connected auditor to another non-connected auditor 
are control firms (Treat = 0). Post is an indicator variable equal to one for the periods subsequent 
to auditor switch, and zero otherwise.22 Thus, Post * Treat captures the incremental change in the 
likelihood of restatements for the treatment firms, relative to the control firms.23 Following prior 
                                           
21 We separately test with DecRestatement because auditors tend to be more concerned about their clients’ income-
increasing misstatements which are more likely intentional and egregious (Kim et al. 2003). When DecRestatement is 
used as the dependent variable, we exclude income-increasing restatements from the sample.  
22  Since our auditor switches occur in 2003–2012, the Post variable captures years up to 2013. However, the 
misstatements in the subsequent two years (e.g., 2012 and 2013) may have not been fully detected because the 
detection normally takes a few years. To alleviate this concern, we replicate the analysis after limiting the sample to 
auditor switches in 2003-2010. The results, unreported, are qualitatively similar. 
23 Ai and Norton (2003) show that, in a logit model with interaction terms, the effect of the interaction term on 
expected probability can be different in sign from the coefficient loading on the interaction term. However, Puhani 
(2012) shows that, when the interaction term is simply the product of a treatment group dummy variable (e.g., Treat) 
and a treatment period dummy variable (e.g., Post), the sign of the treatment effect is equal to the sign of the coefficient 
of the interaction term. Based on insights derived from this study, we believe that it is appropriate to infer the sign of 
the treatment effect based on the sign of the Post * Treat coefficient, as we have done. 
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research (e.g. Cohen et al. 2014), we control for client- and auditor-specific characteristics that 
may affect audit quality. Definitions for these control variables are presented in the Appendix. In 
addition, we include industry dummies to control for time-invariant industry-fixed effects and year 
dummies to control for possible changes in audit quality over time, respectively.24  
Our second proxy measures the auditor’s ability to limit earnings management to meet or 
beat two earnings benchmarks: analysts’ consensus forecasts and zero earnings. If connected 
auditors are more (less) likely to detect and constrain earnings management aimed at avoiding 
negative earnings surprises or losses, the clients of these auditors are less (more) likely to meet or 
beat these two benchmarks. To test this prediction, we estimate the following model adapted from 
Dhaliwal et al. (2015) and Reichelt and Wang (2010): 
MeetConsensus (or MeetZero) = θ0 + θ1 Post + θ2 Treat + θ3 Post * Treat 
+ θ4 LogTA + θ5 ROA + θ6 Market-to-Book + θ7 Leverage + θ8 Issue  
+ θ9 NonAuditFeeRatio + θ10 MSALeader + θ11 NationalLeader + θ12 Cimportance  
+ θ13 Big4 + θ14 AlumniAud + θ15 CEOisChair + θ16 BDindep  
+ θ17 ACsize + θ18 ACexpertise + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε     (3) 
 
where MeetConsensus is an indicator variable equal to one if earnings meet or beat the latest 
analysts' consensus earnings forecasts by three cents per share or less, and zero otherwise. 
MeetZero is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports a small profit that is less than 
three percent of the average total assets, and zero otherwise.25 Similar to the previous model, Post 
* Treat captures the incremental change in the likelihood that the treatment firms meet or beat the 
earnings benchmarks, relative to that of the control firms. Following previous studies (e.g. Reichelt 
                                           
24 In all models for audit quality tests, continuous variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent, and the p-
values are calculated with client firm-clustered standard errors.  
25 Our untabulated analyses show that the results are qualitatively similar when MeetConsensus is defined as one if 
earnings meet or beat the latest analysts' consensus earnings forecasts by one cent per share or less and zero otherwise, 
and MeetZero as one if the firm reports a small profit that is less than one percent of the average total assets and zero 
otherwise, although the mean values of MeetConsensus and MeetZero are much smaller (0.097 and 0.048).  
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and Wang 2010), we add several control variables, defined in the Appendix.  
Our third proxy is absolute discretionary accruals. Since Keung and Shih (2014) suggest that 
performance-matching procedures in Kothari et al. (2005) may introduce noise into measurement 
of discretionary accruals, we use both performance-matched discretionary accruals and unmatched 
ones estimated from the Jones model. If CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks lead to higher (lower) audit 
quality, we expect firms switching to connected auditors to report smaller (greater) absolute 
discretionary accruals. We test this prediction by estimating the following model adapted from 
Reichelt and Wang (2010): 
|PMJDA| (or |JDA|) = γ0 + γ1 Post + γ2 Treat + γ3 Post * Treat 
+ γ4 LogTA + γ5 ROA + γ6 Market-to-Book + γ7 Leverage + γ8 Issue  
+ γ9 AltmanZ + γ10 StdCFO + γ11 LitIndustry + γ12 FirmAge +  
+ γ13 NonAuditFeeRatio + γ14 MSALeader + γ15 NationalLeader + γ16 Cimportance  
+ γ17 Big4 + γ18 AlumniAud + γ19 CEOisChair + γ20 BDindep  
+ γ21 ACsize + γ22 ACexpertise + Industry dummies + Year dummies + ε     (4) 
 
where |PMJDA| is absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 
2005) and |JDA| is absolute discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones model (Jones 1991). 
Post * Treat captures the incremental change in the absolute discretionary accruals of firms 
switching to connected auditors, compared with those switching to non-connected auditors. As in 
prior studies (e.g., Reichelt and Wang 2010), we include several control variables, defined in the 
Appendix.   
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Auditor selection analysis 
Table 2, Panel A provides the transition matrix of Big 4 appointments for our sample firms. 
Among 597 sample firms that change auditors, 136 clients of PwC switch to other Big 4 auditors. 
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Likewise, 121, 112, and 98 clients switch from EY, Deloitte, or KPMG, respectively. Also, 130 
clients of non-Big 4 firms upgrade their auditors to Big 4 auditors. Among these sample firms, 113 
clients switch to PwC as their incoming external auditor, while 193, 129, and 162 firms appoint 
EY, Deloitte, or KPMG, respectively. This distribution is similar to that reported by Dhaliwal et al. 
(2015).  
Table 2, Panel B provides univariate test results of whether clients tend to hire connected 
auditors. Among 597 auditor change firms, the CEO/CFOs of 56 firms are connected to PwC 
through their outside directorships, while the CEO/CFOs of the other 541 firms do not have such 
a connection with PwC. More importantly, 17 of 56 firms with CEO/CFO-PwC ties (30.4 percent) 
appoint PwC as their new auditor, while only 96 of 541 firms without such ties (17.7 percent) 
appoint PwC. This difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.022), indicating that clients 
with CEO/CFO-PwC ties are more likely to switch to PwC than clients without such ties. The 
results are similar for EY (51.5 percent vs. 29.9 percent with p-value < 0.001) and Deloitte (32.4 
percent vs. 20.9 percent with p-value = 0.099). The relationship is weaker for KPMG, but the 
difference is in the same direction (31.9 percent vs. 26.7 percent with p-value = 0.444). The last 
row of Panel B shows that the total number of observations whose CEO/CFOs have connections 
with any Big 4 auditors is 206 (56 + 66 + 37 + 47), while the number of observations without such 
a connection is 2,182 (541 + 531 + 560 + 550). We find that 37.9 percent of the former firms 
appoint connected auditors, while just 23.8 percent of the latter firms appoint the respective 
auditors. The difference is statistically significant at p<0.001.26 Overall, our univariate analysis in 
Table 2 provides preliminary support for H1.  
                                           
26 Following Dhaliwal et al. (2015), when we employ 25 percent, which is a probability that one of Big 4 auditors is 
randomly selected, as an alternative benchmark, the difference is still significant at p<0.001. 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the auditor selection 
model for each Big 4 auditor. Firms currently hiring XX auditor are excluded in XX selection 
analysis because they cannot switch to the same XX auditor. This exclusion leaves 461, 476, 485, 
and 499 firms for the model with PwC, EY, Deloitte, or KPMG, respectively. The panel shows that 
about 9.3 percent of the PwC sample have CEO/CFO-PwC ties. Likewise, about 10.9, 5.7, and 7.8 
percent of the sample for EY, Deloitte, or KPMG are connected to EY, Deloitte, or KPMG, 
respectively. 
Table 3, Panel B presents the logistic regression results of auditor selection decisions for 
each Big 4 auditor. We find positive and significant coefficients on ConnXX for all Big 4 auditors 
but KPMG. These results suggest that our sample firms tend to hire auditors connected to their 
CEO/CFOs, in line with our univariate test results. Control variables are generally consistent with 
previous research (Lennox and Park 2007; Dhaliwal et al. 2015). For example, firms that hired Big 
4 auditors previously (FBig4) are more likely to appoint another Big 4 auditor. Consistent with 
Lennox and Park (2007) and Shu (2000), firms tend to hire well-matched auditors (MatchXX). 
Finally, firms with officers who formerly worked for audit firms are more likely to hire their alumni 
(AlumniXX).27 For robustness, we perform auditor selection analysis with a multinomial logit 
model instead of a set of binary ones because a client may consider all Big 4 auditors at the same 
time. Utilizing firms appointing KPMG as a reference group, we find that firms connected to PwC 
(Deloitte, EY) are more likely to appoint PwC (Deloitte, EY) over KPMG, giving credence to our 
previous results.  
                                           
27 Our results are robust when we add a bankruptcy score, leverage, an indicator for the issuance of debt and equity, 
board independence, and an indicator for CEO-chairperson duality, following Lennox and Park (2007). 
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Since both the embeddedness and agency views predict the same positive relationship 
between CEO/CFO-auditor ties and the appointment of connected auditors, it is difficult to infer 
which view drives the reported results. However, it seems reasonable to predict that, under the 
embeddedness view, the likelihood of hiring a connected auditor is higher when the connected 
auditor exhibits superior audit quality at the connected firms. To further provide insights, we 
examine whether hiring a connected auditor is associated with observed audit quality at connected 
firms. We restrict the sample to home firms with at least one connected firm. Note that when a 
home firm is connected to more than a connected firm, we include the respective pairs in the 
sample. We estimate the following model adapted from Lennox and Park (2007):  
HiringConn = π0 + π1 ConnAQ + π2 ConnAbFees + π3 LogTA + π4 BankruptcyScore  
+ π5 FBig4 + π6 LitIndustry + π7 ACsize + π8 ACexpertise + π9 SpecConn  
+ π10 MatchConn + π11 AlumniConn + π12 Dismissal + ε      (5) 
 
where HiringConn is an indicator variable equal to one if the home firm hires its connected auditor, 
and zero otherwise. ConnAQ is either ConnAQ1, ConnAQ2, or ConnAQ3; ConnAQ1 is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the connected firm does not misstate its financial statements in the past 
two years, and zero otherwise; ConnAQ2 is an indicator variable equal to one if the connected firm 
does not meet or just beat zero earnings benchmarks in the past two years, and zero otherwise; 
ConnAQ3 is an indicator variable equal to one if the connected firm's absolute performance-
matched discretionary accruals belong to the lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. ConnAbFees is 
a quartile variable that is transformed from abnormal fee of the connected firm. ConnAbFees takes 
0 (lowest quartile), 1, 2, and 3 (highest quartile). Definitions for the control variables are presented 
in the Appendix. The results are provided in Table 3, Panel C. All three columns show that the 
likelihood of hiring a connected auditor is not significantly associated with higher audit quality of 
connected auditors, which is inconsistent with our prediction under the embeddedness view. In 
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addition, we find a negative and marginally significant coefficient on ConnAbFees in two columns, 
which implies that the likelihood of hiring connected auditors is lower when the auditors receive 
abnormally high audit fees from connected firms.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2. Audit quality analysis 
4.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4, Panel A provides summary statistics for the dependent variables used for our audit 
quality analyses. Among 1,352 (1,308) firm-year observations used for the restatement (income-
decreasing restatement) analysis, about 13.2 (12.1) percent misstate their financial statements and 
subsequently restate them (restate their reported earnings downward). Regarding the sample for 
meeting/beating analysis, 22.2 percent of the sample report earnings that meet or beat analysts’ 
consensus forecasts, while 15.6 percent report small profits. The mean values of |PMJDA| and 
|JDA| are both 0.064, which are comparable to prior studies. 
Table 4, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for control variables. The key statistics for 
control variables appear similar to those in prior research (e.g., Cohen et al. 2014; Reichelt and 
Wang 2010). The mean value of firm size (LogTA) and return on assets (ROA) are 20.261 
and -0.018, respectively. The mean value of non-audit fees paid to external auditors are 16.8 
percent of total fees (NonAuditFeeRatio). The average audit committee size (ACsize) is 3.525.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.2. Restatement analysis 
Table 5 reports the results of the logistic regression of restatements. In column (1), we 
estimate the effect of hiring connected auditors on the likelihood of misstatements. The coefficient 
on Post * Treat is positive and significant at p<0.01, suggesting that the increase in the likelihood 
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of misstatements subsequent to auditor switch is greater for firms switching to connected auditors 
than for firms switching to non-connected auditors.28 A negative coefficient on Post is consistent 
with the declining trend of restatements over time (Scholz 2014). A negative coefficient on Treat 
implies that, in the pre-auditor switch period, treatment firms are less likely to restate their financial 
statements, relative to control firms, which could be derived from differences in firm 
characteristics between two groups (e.g., firm size). To mitigate this concern, we replicate our 
analysis using the propensity score matched sample in a later section and find that our results are 
qualitatively unchanged.  
Since income-decreasing restatements could better capture managers’ opportunistic 
reporting behavior (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011; Hennes et al. 2014),29 we use income-decreasing 
restatements as an alternative measure for audit quality in column (2). We find that the coefficient 
on Post * Treat is also positive and significant at p<0.01 in this column, corroborating our finding 
in column (1). Overall, the findings in Table 5 suggest that firms that switch to connected auditors 
are more likely to misstate their financial statements subsequent to auditor changes than those that 
switch to non-connected auditors, consistent with H2b that hiring a connected auditor impairs 
subsequent audit quality.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2.3. Analysis for meeting or beating earnings benchmarks  
                                           
28 To assess the economic significance of the results in Column (1), Table 5, we estimate how the likelihood of a 
misstatement for treatment and control firms changes from the pre- to post-auditor-change periods, holding other 
variables constant at their median values. The misstatement probabilities are found to be (a) 3.4% for treatment firms 
in the pre-period, (b) 11.8% for treatment firms in the post-period, (c) 7.6% for control firms in the pre-period, and (d) 
4.0% for control firms in the post-period. Thus, the increase in the misstatement probabilities for treatment firms is 
substantially greater than that for control firms, suggesting that the results are economically significant, as well as 
statistically significant. 
29 Note that income-decreasing restatements occur after firms previously engage in aggressive, income-increasing 
earnings management. 
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Table 6 shows the logistic regression results of meeting or beating two earnings benchmarks. 
In column (1), we test whether firms appointing connected auditors are more likely to meet or beat 
analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. We find a positive and significant coefficient on Post * 
Treat at p<0.05, indicating that the increase in the likelihood of meeting or beating the analysts’ 
forecasts subsequent to auditor change is greater for firms hiring connected auditors than for firms 
hiring non-connected auditors. When we alternatively utilize meeting or beating zero earnings 
benchmarks in column (2), the results are qualitatively similar. These results imply that connected 
auditors allow managers greater accounting discretion to avoid negative earnings surprises or loss, 
supporting H2b. The signs of control variables are generally consistent with prior research. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.2.4. Discretionary accruals analysis 
Table 7 reports regression results for absolute discretionary accruals. In column (1), where 
we employ performance-matched discretionary accruals, we find that the coefficient on Post * 
Treat is significantly positive at p<0.10, suggesting that firms switching to connected auditors 
exhibit a greater increase in absolute discretionary accruals from the pre- to the post-period than 
control firms. In column (2), where we alternatively use discretionary accruals estimated from the 
Jones model, we again find evidence that firms hiring connected auditors report greater absolute 
discretionary accruals, compared to firms switching to non-connected auditors. The signs of 
control variables are generally consistent with prior research. In sum, all regression results using 
three proxies for audit quality support H2b rather than H2a. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.2.5. Tests with propensity score matched sample 
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Despite our research design of a difference-in-differences model, it is still possible that the 
difference in firm characteristics between treatment and control samples, rather than our variable 
of interest (hiring connected auditors), drives our results from audit quality analyses. In other 
words, if our control firms do not share similar firm characteristics with our treatment firms, this 
difference may introduce selection bias in evaluating the consequences of the treatment effect. To 
mitigate this concern, we perform a matched-sample analysis based on propensity score matching 
(PSM), following Lawrence et al. (2011). 
We first calculate the likelihood that a firm switches to a connected auditor (i.e., a propensity 
score) by estimating a logistic regression model where the dependent variable equals one if the 
firm switches to a connected auditor and zero otherwise, and the independent variables are 
extracted from the respective audit quality models, Eq. (2) through (4), and measured in the year 
prior to auditor switch. We match a firm switching to a connected auditor (i.e., a treatment firm) 
with a firm switching to a non-connected auditor (i.e., a control firm) that has the closest propensity 
score, using a caliper distance of 0.03 without replacement, following Lawrence et al. (2011).30,31 
Table 8, Panel A shows the mean differences in independent variables between the treatment 
and control samples before and after PSM. Before the matching, treatment firms are larger (LogTA). 
They also have larger audit committee size (ACsize), lower non-audit service fee ratio 
(NonAuditFeeRatio), and lower financial distress (AltmanZ) than control firms. After PSM, we 
                                           
30 The only exception is meeting/beating analysts’ consensus forecasts analysis where we do not use any caliper 
distance due to the small sample size. When we construct matching with the caliper distance of 0.03 for this analysis, 
only four treatment firms are matched with control firms, yielding 32 firm-year observations (8 firms * 4 years). 
31 Our results are robust to using alternative caliper widths of 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, or 0.3. Also, the results are qualitatively 
similar when we replicate the analyses with replacement.   
28 
find that none of these firm characteristics is significantly different between two samples, 
indicating that our matching is conducted effectively. 
Table 8, Panel B (Panel C and Panel D) presents the regression results of restatements 
(meet/beat earnings benchmarks and discretionary accruals) using PSM sample. The results are 
largely consistent with those reported earlier. For instance, the coefficient on Post * Treat is 
positive in all panels, five of which are statistically significant at least at p<0.10.32 Thus, our PSM 
sample tests suggest that the observed decline in audit quality subsequent to switching to a 
connected auditor is unlikely to be attributable to the difference in firm characteristics.33 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4.2.6. Ties through the same audit office or audit committee membership 
In this section we examine whether the negative relation between CEO/CFO-auditor 
interlocks and audit quality is more pronounced either (a) when the home and connected firms hire 
auditors from the same office of an audit firm or (b) when the CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks are via 
the CEO/CFO’s AC membership in the connected firm. When home and connected firms appoint 
auditors from the same office of an audit firm, the CEO/CFOs are likely not only to have a greater 
bargaining power over the connected auditor but also to form a closer relationship with the auditor. 
At the same time, this situation will foster information transfers between the CEO/CFO and the 
auditor. Therefore, the effect of network ties between CEO/CFO and auditor on audit quality can 
                                           
32 The only insignificant coefficient on Post * Treat is in the meet/beat analysts’ consensus forecasts analysis, which 
may be attributable to the smaller sample size used in the analysis. 
33 One disadvantage of our PSM model is a small sample size relative to the number of predictors, which reduces 
statistical powers of our tests. To alleviate this concern, we alternatively estimate each model using bootstrap. For 
each analysis, we generate 100 datasets from the original sample. The number of observations in each of 100 samples 
is the same as the number for the original sample. Untabulated results reveal that the results are qualitatively similar. 
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be more pronounced when home and connected firms hire auditors from the same office, regardless 
of whether the implication is positive or negative.  
Moreover, while we use the CEO/CFO’s outside directorship as a primary measure in main 
analyses, the interaction with the auditor will be more active when the CEO/CFO serves on the 
AC of the connected firm, given that the AC oversees all audit-related matters. Thus, the 
CEO/CFOs are likely to build closer network ties to connected auditors and to have a greater 
bargaining power when they serve on the AC of connected firms. Accordingly, the effect of 
CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks on audit quality could be greater when the CEO/CFO serves on the 
AC of the connected firm.34  
Considering the two above situations, we split all CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks into the 
interlocks through the same office or AC membership, Treat (Same Off or AC), and the interlocks 
through different audit offices of an audit firm and non-AC board membership, Treat (Others). 
Thus, Treat (Same Off or AC) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm switches to a 
connected auditor through either the same audit office or AC membership, and zero otherwise. 
Treat (Others) is an indicator variable equal to one if Treat is equal to one and Treat (Same Off or 
AC) is equal to zero, and zero otherwise.  
Table 9, Panel A shows the results of logistic regression of restatements. We find a positive 
and significant coefficient on Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) at p<0.01 whether Restatement or 
DecRestatement is used as the dependent variable. However, we find positive but insignificant 
                                           
34 Among 597 firms switching to Big 4 auditors in the sample, the number of firms with CEO/CFO-auditor ties via 
AC membership is 98, while that via board membership is 185. Moreover, the number of firms switching to connected 
auditors based on AC memberships is only 32, compared to 78 based on board membership. The number of firms 
switching to connected auditors via the same audit office is also small (37). To avoid problems resulting from small 
treatment sample, we combine these two types of connections into Treat (Same off or AC). The number of firms with 
CEO/CFO-auditor ties through either the same office or AC membership is 57. 
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coefficients on Post * Treat (Others) in both models. Importantly, the results of Wald tests at the 
bottom of the panel show that the difference in the coefficients on Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) 
and Post * Treat (Others) is statistically significant in both models, indicating that firms switching 
to connected auditors through either the same office or AC membership are more likely to misstate 
their financial statements subsequent to auditor change, compared to firms switching to connected 
auditors through different audit offices of an audit firm and non-AC board membership.  
When we use meeting or beating analysts’ consensus forecasts as the dependent variable in 
the first column of Panel B, we find a positive and significant coefficient on Post * Treat (Same 
Off or AC), which is statistically greater than that on Post * Treat (Others). When zero earnings 
are used as the benchmark, both coefficients on Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) and Post * Treat 
(Others) are statistically significant, with an insignificant difference between the coefficients. 
Panel C reports the results of discretionary accruals analysis. In this panel, we find insignificant 
differences between the coefficients on Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) and Post * Treat (Others).  
Overall, half of our audit quality analyses provide evidence suggesting that the negative 
relationship between CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks and audit quality is more pronounced when the 
connections are through the same office or AC membership. In addition, when the interlocks are 
merely through different audit offices of an audit firm and non-AC board membership, the relation 
is significant only in one of the six regression analyses. These findings suggest that the adverse 
effect of hiring connected auditors on subsequent audit quality appears relatively stronger when 
the connection is via the same office or AC membership.  
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
4.2.7. Audit fee analysis 
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Although it is not the focus of this paper, we examine how audit fees at home firms change 
surrounding auditor switches to connected auditors. On the one hand, it is possible that the 
CEO/CFO’s greater bargaining power arising from hiring a connected auditor leads to audit fee 
reductions at home firms. Moreover, connected auditors may charge lower fees if better 
communication with the CEO/CFO facilitates efficient information exchanges, resulting in less 
audit effort. On the contrary, home firms might render a fee premium to their connected auditors 
in return for greater accounting discretion and/or heightened auditor litigation/reputation risk. 
Accordingly, it is ex ante unclear how audit fee pricing will change at home firms.  
Another interesting issue is the change in audit fees at connected firms. The CEO/CFOs may 
attempt to influence their connected firms to pay higher audit fees to the connected auditors to 
reinforce their relationship. In this case, audit fees at connected firms may increase after home 
firms hire connected auditors. If the CEO/CFOs do not have such intentions or a significant 
influence over fee decisions at connected firms, hiring connected auditors at home firms may not 
induce substantial changes in audit fees at connected firms.  
Table 10, Panel A presents univariate comparisons of changes in fee metrics at home firms 
between firms hiring a connected auditor and those hiring a non-connected auditor. For the analysis, 
we limit our sample to home firms with at least one connected firm and calculate audit fee changes 
(Changes in log (audit fees)) and abnormal audit fee changes (Changes in abnormal audit fees) 
from t-1 to t.35 When those changes are compared between firms hiring a connected auditor and 
those hiring a non-connected auditor, we find that Changes in abnormal audit fees (Changes in 
log (audit fees)) is significantly (insignificantly) greater for the former. We find that the changes 
                                           
35 Abnormal fee is estimated based on the model by Choi et al. (2010). The definition of ConnAbFees in Appendix 
provides the details of the model. 
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in total fees and abnormal total fees are also significantly greater for the former. In addition, as 
reported in Panel B, the changes in the same fee metrics at connected firms are significantly greater 
after their respective home firms hire connected auditors than non-connected auditors.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that, compared to non-connected auditors, connected 
auditors tend to receive higher fees from both home and connected firms after they are hired at 
home firms. This evidence is inconsistent with the CEO/CFO’s bargaining power over fee pricing 
or better communication with auditors reducing fees. Rather, the results are more consistent with 
the CEO/CFO’s willingness to pay higher fees to the connected auditors at both home and 
connected firms to compensate for greater accounting discretion for their home firms and/or 
resulting auditor litigation/reputation risk.  
 [Insert Table 10 here] 
4.3. Additional analyses 
We perform several additional analyses. First, one might argue that AC-auditor ties through 
outside directorship also affect auditor choice decisions and subsequent audit quality. 36  To 
examine whether the AC-auditor ties confound our findings, we repeat analyses after controlling 
for this relationship. We find that AC-auditor ties have no significant impact on auditor choice or 
audit quality. More importantly, our main findings remain qualitatively similar after the AC-auditor 
ties are controlled for in each model.  
Second, we examine whether CEO-auditor and CFO-auditor ties have different implications 
for auditor selection decisions and subsequent audit quality. When we replicate four auditor choice 
regressions using CEO-auditor ties, untabulated results show all positive coefficients for ConnXX, 
                                           
36 Consistent with this argument, Chen et al. (2014) show that such interlocks are positively associated with ERCs. 
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two of which are statistically significant at p<0.05. When we test with CFO-auditor ties, we find 
significantly positive coefficients on ConnXX for PwC and EY and insignificant coefficients for 
Deloitte and KPMG. Furthermore, when we repeat audit quality analyses, untabulated results 
indicate that our inferences remain largely similar when we examine CEO-auditor and CFO-
auditor interlocks separately. 
Third, when we exclude firms switching from non-Big 4 auditors from the sample, our 
results from auditor selection analyses remain similar. Regarding audit quality, we find 
qualitatively similar evidence from the analyses with restatements and meeting/beating earnings 
benchmarks. However, when we utilize absolute discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality, 
we lose statistical significance. 
Fourth, while we focus on the effect of hiring interlocked auditors on the home firm’s audit 
quality, it is possible that the connected firm’s audit quality changes subsequent to the home firm’s 
appointment of the connected auditor.37 Our untabulated analyses find that the changes in audit 
quality for the connected firms of our treatment firms are statistically indifferent from those in 
connected firms of our control firms, suggesting that the adverse effect of CEO/CFO-auditor ties 
on audit quality exists only for the home firms. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates whether CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks through outside directorship 
affect auditor selection decisions and whether hiring connected auditors influences subsequent 
                                           
37 To examine this possibility, we adopt a difference-in-differences research design in which we compare the changes 
in audit quality from the pre- to post-auditor-switch periods for the connected firms of our treatment firms, with the 
changes in audit quality for other connected firms of our control firms, using our three proxies for audit quality. 
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audit quality. Our results show that home firms with such ties are more likely to hire connected 
auditors. We also find that switching to such connected auditors results in a lower audit quality, as 
evidenced by a greater likelihood of restatements, a higher propensity of meeting or beating 
earnings benchmarks, and greater absolute discretionary accruals. This evidence is more 
pronounced when the connection is via the same auditor office or AC membership. The results 
based on the PSM are consistent with prior findings.  
This study provides useful policy implications. First, while SOX mandates that ACs be 
solely responsible for auditor selection, our evidence indicates that some managers continue to 
intrude on the decisions to appoint auditors from their networks. This suggests that the ACs of 
these firms fail to remove managers’ influence over auditor appointment. Second, although SOX 
enforces various mechanisms to strengthen auditor independence and audit quality, our results 
show that external networks between managers and auditors can still undermine auditor 
independence and audit quality. Thus, this study calls for ensuring both AC effectiveness and 
auditor independence, especially in the presence of CEO/CFO-auditor interlocks.  
Our study is subject to several caveats. First, we do not directly operationalize network ties 
of managers with audit engagement partners. Future research is warranted to examine the effect of 
the connections at the audit partner level when relevant data become available in the U.S. Second, 
our analyses are limited to the appointments of Big 4 auditors. Thus, our results may not be 
generalized to firms switching to non-Big 4 auditors. Third, the number of firms that switch to 
connected auditors in our sample is small, which might explain why some results of our audit 
quality tests are weak. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
   
Variable:   Definition: 
Variables Included in Auditor Choice Analyses 
XX  indicator variable equal to one if the incoming auditor is XX, and zero otherwise, 
where XX is either PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers), EY (Ernst & Young), Deloitte, 
or KPMG. 
ConnXX   indicator variable equal to one if CEO/CFOs serve as an independent director of 
another firm who hires the auditor XX, and zero otherwise. 
Fbig4  indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor auditor was a Big 4 auditor, and 
zero otherwise. 
MatchXX  indicator variable equal to one if the firm is better matched with XX than with any 
of the other Big 4 auditors, and zero otherwise. Following Lennox and Park (2007) 
and Dhaliwal et al. (2015), we begin with COMPUSTAT and Audit Analytics to 
identify Big 4 clients from 2003 to 2012 and estimate four logistic regression 
models where the dependent variable is each of Big 4 auditors and independent 
variables are firm size, financial health, and the client’s industry identity (based on 
two-digit SIC codes). Using estimated coefficients from the four regressions, we 
measure the degree to which a given client is closely matched with each auditor’s 
existing clients. For example, a client is better matched with PwC’s clientele if the 
client’s estimated probability of matching with PwC’s clientele is the highest. 
SpecXX  indicator variable equal to one if the auditor XX has the largest market share of 
audit fees in the industry-year cohort that the given client belongs to, and zero 
otherwise. 
AlumniXX  indicator variable equal to one if the CEO, CFO, or Chief Accounting Officer 
(CAO) formerly worked for the auditor XX, and zero otherwise. 
ACsize  the number of directors on the audit committee. 
ACexpertise  indicator variable equal to one if audit committee includes at least one accounting 
expert, and zero otherwise. A director is defined as an accounting expert if he/she 
has work accounting experience as certified public accountants, CFO, controller, or 
vice president of finance, following Dhaliwal et al. (2015). 
HiringConn  indicator variable equal to one if the home firm hires its connected auditor, and zero 
otherwise. 
ConnAQ1  indicator variable equal to one if the connected firm does not misstate its financial 
statements in the past two years, and zero otherwise. 
ConnAQ2  indicator variable equal to one if the connected firm does not meet or just beat zero 
earnings benchmarks in the past two years, and zero otherwise. 
ConnAQ3 
 
 indicator variable equal to one if the connected firm's absolute value of 
performance-matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005) belongs to the 
lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. 
ConnAbFees  quartile variable which is transformed from abnormal fees of the connected firm. 
ConnAbFees takes 0 (lowest quartile), 1, 2, and 3 (highest quartile). Abnormal fee is 
calculated following Choi et al. (2010). Abnormal fee is the residual of audit fee 
regression where control variables are LogTA, ROA, Loss, Leverage, Issue, 
LitIndustry, sum of the inventory and account receivables, the square root of the 
number of employees, a foreign operation dummy, an extraordinary item dummy, and 
year and two-digit industry indicator variables. 
BankruptcyScore  bankruptcy score, calculated by - 4.336 + (- 4.512 * return on assets) + (5.679 * 
debt/assets) + (0.004 * current ratio). 
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SpecConn   indicator variable equal to one if the connected auditor is MSA-level industry 
specialist auditor, and zero otherwise. 
MatchConn  indicator variable equal to one if the connected auditor better matched with the 
home firm than with any of the other big 4 auditors, and zero otherwise. 
AlumniConn  indicator variable equal to one if the home firm has an alumni affiliation with the 
connected auditor, and zero otherwise. 
Dismissal  Indicator variable equal to one if the firm dismissed its predecessor auditor, and 
zero otherwise. 
Variables Included in Audit Quality Analyses 
Restatement  indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year financial statements are misstated 
and subsequently restated, and zero otherwise. 
DecRestatement  indicator variable equal to one if the earnings for the firm-year are overstated and 
subsequently restated downward, and zero otherwise. 
MeetConsensus  indicator variable equal to one if earnings meet or beat the latest analysts' consensus 
earnings forecasts by three cents per share or less, and zero otherwise. 
MeetZero  indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports a small profit (defined as a profit 
that is less than three percent of the average total assets), and zero otherwise. 
|PMJDA|  absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals following Kothari et 
al. (2005).  
|JDA|  absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones model (Jones 
1991).  
Post   indicator variable equal to one for the periods subsequent to auditor switch, and 
zero otherwise. 
Treat   indicator variable equal to one if the firm switches to a connected auditor, and zero 
otherwise. 
Treat (Same Off or AC) indicator variable equal to one if the firm switches to a connected auditor through 
either the same audit office or AC membership, and zero otherwise. 
Treat (Others)   indicator variable equal to one if Treat is equal to one and Treat (Same Off or AC) 
is equal to zero, and zero otherwise. 
LogTA  natural logarithm of total assets. 
ROA  return on assets, defined as net income divided by total assets. 
Market-to-Book  market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
Leverage  sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. 
Issue  indicator variable equal to one if sum of the equity and debt issued during the most 
recent three years is greater than five percent of total assets (AT) for year t, and 
zero otherwise. 
NonAuditFeeRatio  non-audit service fees divided by total fees paid to the auditor. 
MSALeader  indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s auditor is office-level industry specialist 
auditor following Reichelt and Wang (2010), and zero otherwise. 
NationalLeader  indicator variable equal to one if the firm's auditor is the national-level industry 
specialist auditor following Reichelt and Wang (2010), and zero otherwise. 
Cimportance  ratio of the client’s audit fees to the audit office’s total revenues from audit 
services. 
Big4  indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s auditor is one of Big 4 audit firms, and 
zero otherwise. 
AlumniAud  indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s CEO, CFO, or Chief Accounting 
Officer (CAO) formerly worked for the auditor, and zero otherwise. 
CEOisChair  indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairperson of the board, and zero 
otherwise. 
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BDindep  the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
AltmanZ  probability of bankruptcy based on the Altman’s Z score (Altman 1983). 
StdCFO  standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets from 
t-2 to t. 
LitIndustry  indicator variable equal to one if the firm operates in a highly litigious industry 
defined as industries with SIC codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-
5961, 7370-7370, and zero otherwise. 
FirmAge   the number of years the firm has Compustat data. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Firms switching auditors to a Big 4 audit firm over 2003-2012 from an 
intersection of Compustat and Audit Analytics  
         1,157  
 Less: Firms with missing SIC from Compustat  (163) 
 Less: Firms in financial services industries (SIC codes 6000-6999)  (189) 
 Less: Firms not covered by BoardEx  (166) 
 
Less: Firms with a missing value on any of the control variables for 
auditor choice analyses  
 
(42) 
 
Number of firms used in auditor selection analyses              597  
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Table 2 
Distribution of Auditor Changes  
Panel A. Transition Matrix 
    Incoming auditor 
    PwC  EY  Deloitte  KPMG  Total 
Predecessor  
auditor 
 PwC    45  50  41  136 
 EY  33    34  54  121 
 Deloitte  32  49    31  112 
 KPMG  22  49  27    98 
 Non-Big4  26   50   18   36   130 
 Total  113  193  129  162  597 
             
 
Panel B. Auditor Selection Depending on the Presence of CEO/CFO-auditor Interlocks 
Incoming  
Auditor 
 Connection  #(AudChg)  #(Hire)  %(Hire)  Difference  P-value 
PwC  No  541  96  17.7%  
12.6% 
 
0.022** 
  Yes  56  17  30.4%   
             
EY  No  531  159  29.9%  
21.6% 
 
0.001*** 
  Yes  66  34  51.5%   
             
Deloitte  No  560  117  20.9%  
11.5% 
 
0.099* 
  Yes  37  12  32.4%   
             
KPMG  No  550  147  26.7%  
5.2% 
 
0.444  
    Yes   47   15   31.9%    
Total  
  No   2,182  519  23.8%  
14.1% 
 
0.001*** 
  Yes   206  78  37.9%   
Panel A describes a transition matrix of auditor changes in our sample. It includes the identities of predecessor and 
incoming auditors and the number of clients for every combination of them. Panel B provides univariate test results of 
whether clients with CEO/CFOs connected to XX auditor are more likely to hire XX as their external auditor. # 
(AudChg) is the number of auditor change. # (Hire) is the number of clients hiring the given auditor XX. % (Hire) is # 
(Hire) divided by # (AudChg). Difference is differences in % (Hire) between connected sample and unconnected sample. 
*, **, *** statistically different from zero (two-tailed) at the <0.10, <0.05, and <0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Auditor Selection Analyses 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  XX=PwC  XX=EY  XX=Deloitte  XX=KPMG 
Variable  Mean Std  Mean Std  Mean Std  Mean Std 
XX  0.245 0.430  0.405 0.491  0.265 0.442  0.324 0.468 
ConnXX  0.093 0.291  0.109 0.312  0.057 0.233  0.078 0.268 
FBig4  0.718 0.450  0.726 0.446  0.731 0.443  0.739 0.439 
MatchXX  0.151 0.359  0.638 0.480  0.105 0.307  0.084 0.277 
SpecXX  0.436 0.496  0.193 0.395  0.214 0.410  0.146 0.353 
AlumniXX  0.119 0.324  0.115 0.320  0.074 0.262  0.078 0.268 
ACsize  3.431 0.738  3.434 0.779  3.451 0.768  3.436 0.766 
ACexpertise 0.308 0.226  0.315 0.229  0.310 0.219  0.312 0.230 
N  461  476  485  499 
 
Panel B. Regression Results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Dep: PwC  Dep: EY  Dep: Deloitte  Dep: KPMG 
Variable  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value 
Intercept  -1.599 0.011**  -1.069 0.039**  -1.749 0.002***  -1.289 0.010** 
ConnXX   0.793 0.024**   1.163 0.001***   0.725 0.077*   0.252 0.4840 
FBig4  0.360 0.1660  0.155 0.4810  1.043 0.001***  0.360 0.1240 
MatchXX  0.300 0.3320  0.345 0.091*  0.891 0.008***  0.885 0.011** 
SpecXX  0.318 0.1630  0.559 0.020**  -0.222 0.4350  0.362 0.1950 
AlumniXX  0.745 0.019**  0.380 0.2000  0.462 0.2310  0.961 0.006*** 
ACsize   -0.162 0.3130  0.038 0.7650  -0.054 0.7020  0.065 0.6130 
ACexpertise 1.188 0.016**  -0.214 0.6170  -0.130 0.7890  -0.582 0.1820 
N  461  476  485  499 
Pseudo-R2  0.044  0.042  0.050  0.038 
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Panel C. Connected firms' audit quality and abnormal audit fees 
 
  Dep: HiringConn 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variable  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value  Coeff. P-value 
Intercept  -6.165 0.009***  -6.010 0.011**  -5.513 0.034** 
ConnAQ1   0.673 0.240             
ConnAQ2         0.201 0.603       
ConnAQ3               0.096 0.821 
ConnAbFees   -0.275 0.084*   -0.262 0.096*   -0.219 0.216 
LogTA  0.236 0.040**  0.257 0.024**  0.234 0.060* 
BankruptcyScore  -0.014 0.746  -0.011 0.799  -0.001 0.980 
FBig4  -0.480 0.290  -0.446 0.324  -0.542 0.281 
LitIndustry  -0.023 0.951  0.005 0.989  0.298 0.461 
ACsize  0.048 0.825  0.007 0.974  0.096 0.678 
ACexpertise  -0.099 0.886  -0.137 0.842  -0.480 0.531 
SpecConn  -0.105 0.799  -0.148 0.717  -0.281 0.557 
MatchConn  0.791 0.025**  0.802 0.022**  0.781 0.045** 
AlumniConn  -0.052 0.929  -0.020 0.973  0.285 0.666 
Dismissal  0.344 0.653  0.309 0.685  -0.018 0.983 
N  183  183  154 
Pseudo-R2  0.072  0.067  0.067 
              
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for variables used in auditor selection analyses. Panel B reports the results of auditor 
selection regressions. The dependent variable XX (PwC, EY, Deloitte, or KPMG) is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the incoming audit firm is XX, and zero otherwise, where XX is PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers), EY (Ernst & Young), 
Deloitte, or KPMG. ConnXX is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO/CFO serves as an independent director of 
another firm who hires the auditor XX, and zero otherwise. Panel C provides the results of hiring a connected auditor. The 
sample consists of matched pairs of home and connected firms. HiringConn is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
home firm hires its connected auditor, and zero otherwise. ConnAQ1 is an indicator variable equal to one if the connected 
firm does not misstate its financial statements in the past two years, and zero otherwise. ConnAQ2 is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the connected firm does not meet or just beat zero earnings benchmarks in the past two years, and zero 
otherwise. ConnAQ3 is an indicator variable equal to one if the connected firm's absolute performance-matched 
discretionary accruals belong to the lowest quartile, and zero otherwise. ConnAbFees is a quartile variable which is 
transformed from abnormal fees of the connected firm. ConnAbFees takes 0 (lowest quartile), 1, 2, and 3 (highest quartile). 
*, **, *** statistically different from zero (two-tailed) at the <0.10, <0.05, and <0.01 levels, respectively. Variable 
definitions are included in the Appendix. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Audit Quality Analyses 
Panel A. Audit Quality Variables 
Variable  N  Mean P5 P25 P50 P75 P95 
Restatement         1,352  0.132 0 0 0 0 1 
DecRestatement         1,308  0.121 0 0 0 0 1 
MeetConsensus            472  0.222 0 0 0 0 1 
MeetZero         1,352  0.156 0 0 0 0 1 
|PMJDA|         1,044  0.064 0.004 0.020 0.042 0.079 0.217 
|JDA|         1,044  0.064 0.003 0.021 0.045 0.080 0.211 
        
Panel B. Control Variables 
LogTA         1,352  20.261 17.867 19.093 20.147 21.257 23.145 
ROA         1,352  -0.018 -0.405 -0.041 0.030 0.081 0.188 
Market-to-Book         1,352  2.756 0.141 1.235 2.131 3.450 8.741 
Leverage         1,352  0.230 0.000 0.006 0.189 0.368 0.650 
Issue         1,352  0.769 0 1 1 1 1 
NonAuditFeeRatio         1,352  0.168 0 0 0 0 1 
MSALeader         1,352  0.272 0 0 0 1 1 
NationalLeader         1,352  0.252 0 0 0 1 1 
Cimportance         1,352  0.087 0.003 0.011 0.028 0.099 0.329 
Big4         1,352  0.889 0 1 1 1 1 
AlumniAud         1,352  0.114 0 0 0 0 1 
CEOisChair         1,352  0.532 0 0 1 1 1 
BDindep         1,352  0.813 1 1 1 1 1 
ACsize         1,352  3.525 3 3 3 4 5 
ACexpertise         1,352  0.305 0 0 0 0 1 
AltmanZ         1,044  3.022 -1 1 2 4 9 
StdCFO         1,044  0.072 0 0.024 0.043 0.075 0.201 
LitIndustry         1,044  0.266 0 0 0 1 1 
FirmAge         1,044  22.332 6 11 16 33 55 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for audit quality proxies. The statistics for each variable is based on the sample 
for the respective analysis. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for control variables for audit quality analyses. The 
statistics for all variables with the exception of AltmanZ, StdCFO, LitIndustry, and FirmAge are based on the sample 
for the restatement analysis. Regarding AltmanZ, StdCFO, LitIndustry, and FirmAge, the statistics are based on the 
sample for the discretionary accruals analysis. Variable definitions are included in the Appendix. 
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Table 5 
Regression of Restatement 
 (1)  (2) 
 Restatement  DecRestatement 
Variable Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Intercept -2.999 0.189  -3.650 0.122 
Post -0.673 0.011**  -0.698 0.015** 
Treat -0.857 0.041**  -0.948 0.031** 
Post * Treat 2.015 0.001***   2.232 0.001*** 
LogTA -0.172 0.139  -0.152 0.220 
ROA -0.294 0.589  -0.299 0.596 
Market-to-Book 0.017 0.424  0.016 0.500 
Leverage 0.413 0.481  0.074 0.903 
Issue 0.067 0.822  0.056 0.857 
NonAuditFeeRatio 0.546 0.468  0.684 0.382 
MSALeader 0.098 0.700  0.151 0.573 
NationalLeader 0.451 0.073*  0.489 0.061* 
Cimportance -0.146 0.865  0.026 0.975 
Big4 -0.817 0.026**  -0.797 0.043** 
AlumniAud -0.050 0.889  -0.067 0.852 
CEOisChair -0.329 0.197  -0.312 0.245 
BDindep -1.763 0.248  -2.398 0.127 
ACsize 0.052 0.799  0.141 0.488 
ACexpertise -0.322 0.578  -0.026 0.966 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
N 1,352   1,308  
Pseudo-R2 0.195  0.193 
This table reports regression results of restatement on hiring connected auditors. Treat is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm switches to a connected auditor, and zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable equal to one for the 
periods subsequent to auditor change, and zero otherwise. In Column (2), firms that have experienced income increasing 
restatements are excluded from the sample. *, **, *** statistically different from zero (two-tailed) at the <0.10, <0.05, 
and <0.01 levels, respectively. P-values are calculated using firm-clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are 
included in the Appendix. 
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Table 6 
Regression of Meet/Beat Earnings Benchmarks 
 (1)  (2) 
 MeetConsensus  MeetZero 
Variable Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Intercept -7.925 0.005***  -7.803 0.001*** 
Post 0.087 0.817  -0.501 0.024** 
Treat -1.545 0.120  -1.167 0.011** 
Post * Treat 2.117 0.028**   1.134 0.013** 
LogTA 0.159 0.256  0.167 0.061* 
ROA 0.163 0.884  1.017 0.015** 
Market-to-Book -0.009 0.848  -0.015 0.493 
Leverage -1.058 0.120  1.177 0.023** 
Issue -0.182 0.699  -0.094 0.688 
NonAuditFeeRatio 0.685 0.542  -0.473 0.394 
MSALeader 0.005 0.990  0.063 0.786 
NationalLeader -0.038 0.922  -0.063 0.776 
Cimportance -0.134 0.895  0.711 0.201 
Big4 -1.125 0.064*  -0.316 0.362 
AlumniAud 0.073 0.875  0.049 0.863 
CEOisChair 0.675 0.028**  -0.167 0.394 
BDindep 1.602 0.400  -1.533 0.184 
ACsize 0.004 0.986  0.120 0.311 
ACexpertise 1.485 0.082*  -0.269 0.562 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
N 472   1,352  
Pseudo-R2 0.207  0.131 
This table reports regression results of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks on hiring connected auditors. 
Treat is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm switches to a connected auditor, and zero otherwise. Post 
is an indicator variable equal to one for the periods subsequent to auditor change, and zero otherwise. *, **, 
*** statistically different from zero (two-tailed) at the <0.10, <0.05, and <0.01 levels, respectively. P-values 
are calculated using firm-clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are included in the Appendix. 
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Table 7 
Regression of Absolute Discretionary Accruals  
 (1)  (2) 
 |PMJDA|  |JDA| 
Variable Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Intercept 0.199 0.001***  0.189 0.001*** 
Post -0.001 0.866  -0.001 0.842 
Treat -0.011 0.143  -0.012 0.129 
Post * Treat 0.016 0.083*   0.016 0.091* 
LogTA -0.004 0.084*  -0.004 0.062* 
ROA -0.075 0.004***  -0.077 0.004*** 
Market-to-Book 0.001 0.188  0.001 0.084* 
Leverage 0.022 0.211  0.022 0.196 
Issue -0.001 0.832  -0.003 0.625 
AltmanZ -0.001 0.469  0.000 0.626 
StdCFO 0.014 0.158  0.011 0.342 
LitIndustry 0.009 0.348  0.005 0.599 
FirmAge 0.000 0.400  0.000 0.395 
NonAuditFeeRatio -0.009 0.540  -0.009 0.539 
MSALeader -0.011 0.017**  -0.009 0.049** 
NationalLeader 0.006 0.218  0.007 0.176 
Cimportance -0.001 0.904  0.002 0.830 
Big4 0.000 0.990  -0.002 0.865 
AlumniAud -0.004 0.530  -0.005 0.461 
CEOisChair -0.007 0.207  -0.007 0.161 
BDindep 0.017 0.519  0.011 0.643 
ACsize 0.004 0.174  0.004 0.165 
ACexpertise 0.012 0.328  0.013 0.270 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes 
N 1,044   1,044  
Adjusted R2 0.098  0.095 
This table reports regression results of absolute discretionary accruals on hiring connected auditors. Treat is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm switches to a connected auditor, and zero otherwise. Post is an indicator 
variable equal to one for the periods subsequent to auditor change, and zero otherwise. *, **, *** statistically different 
from zero (two-tailed) at the <0.10, <0.05, and <0.01 levels, respectively. P-values are calculated using firm-
clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are included in the Appendix. 
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Table 8 
Audit Quality Analyses Using Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
Panel A. Differences in Firm Characteristics in the Year prior to Auditor Switch 
 Unmatched Sample  Propensity Score Matched Sample 
Variable 
Treatment 
Sample 
  
Control 
Sample 
  
Mean 
Difference 
  
Treatment 
Sample 
  
Control 
Sample 
  
Mean 
Difference 
  N Mean   N Mean   P-value   N Mean   N Mean   P-value 
LogTA 52 21.098  286 20.079  0.001***  42 20.944  42 21.176  0.508 
ROA 52 0.011  286 -0.025  0.241  42 0.004  42 0.029  0.481 
Market-to-Book 52 3.019  286 2.694  0.572  42 2.946  42 3.090  0.849 
Leverage 52 0.266  286 0.222  0.218  42 0.260  42 0.262  0.975 
Issue 52 0.789  286 0.762  0.676  42 0.786  42 0.762  0.798 
NonAuditFeeRatio 52 0.130  286 0.176  0.049**  42 0.143  42 0.139  0.902 
MSALeader 52 0.289  286 0.283  0.940  42 0.238  42 0.286  0.625 
NationalLeader 52 0.269  286 0.231  0.568  42 0.238  42 0.310  0.469 
Cimportance 52 0.124  286 0.096  0.308  42 0.121  42 0.128  0.862 
Big4 52 0.827  286 0.780  0.422  42 0.833  42 0.881  0.539 
AlumniAud 52 0.058  286 0.101  0.244  42 0.048  42 0.119  0.242 
CEOisChair 52 0.539  286 0.532  0.927  42 0.524  42 0.595  0.516 
BDindep 52 0.816  286 0.814  0.913  42 0.811  42 0.821  0.662 
ACsize 52 3.750  286 3.511  0.090*  42 3.762  42 3.857  0.669 
ACexpertise 52 0.289  286 0.305  0.662  42 0.277  42 0.277  0.998 
AltmanZ 38 2.326  223 3.315  0.027**  25 2.545  25 2.615  0.899 
StdCFO 38 0.061  223 0.072  0.469  25 0.068  25 0.067  0.984 
LitIndustry 38 0.211  223 0.278  0.363  25 0.160  25 0.240  0.490 
FirmAge 38 25.316   223 21.251   0.146   25 27.880   25 23.440   0.314 
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Panel B. Restatement Analyses 
 (1)  (2) 
 Restatement  DecRestatement 
Variable Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Post -1.059 0.292  -1.499 0.321 
Treat -4.451 0.003***  -6.304 0.003*** 
Post * Treat 6.235 0.001***   8.038 0.003*** 
Control Variables Yes  Yes 
N 336  328 
Pseudo-R2 0.642  0.732 
    
Panel C. Meet/Beat Earnings Benchmark Analyses 
 (1)  (2) 
 MeetConsensus  MeetZero 
Variable Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Post 0.666 0.723  -0.495 0.381 
Treat -1.239 0.545  -1.521 0.012** 
Post * Treat 2.548 0.334   1.450 0.089* 
Control Variables Yes  Yes 
N 136   336  
Pseudo-R2 0.498  0.325 
Panel D. Discretionary Accruals Analyses 
 (1)  (2) 
 |PMJDA|  |JDA| 
Variable Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Post -0.012 0.475  -0.013 0.338 
Treat -0.030 0.039**  -0.034 0.007*** 
Post * Treat 0.034 0.080*   0.038 0.024** 
Control Variables Yes  Yes 
N 200   200  
Adjusted-R2 0.181  0.241 
Panel A reports mean differences in independent variables of audit quality models between the treatment and 
control samples before and after propensity score matching. For these comparisons, we use observations in the 
year prior to auditor change. The statistics for all variables, except AltmanZ, StdCFO, LitIndustry, and FirmAge 
are based on the sample for the restatement analysis. Regarding AltmanZ, StdCFO, LitIndustry, and FirmAge, the 
statistics are based on the sample for the discretionary accruals analysis. Panel B (Panel C and Panel D) reports 
regression results of the restatements (meet/beat earnings benchmarks and absolute discretionary accruals) 
analysis using propensity-matched samples. To obtain matched samples, the propensity score is calculated from 
the logistic model where the dependent variable is equal to one if the firm hires a connected auditor, and zero 
otherwise, and the independent variables are extracted from the respective audit quality regression model. Variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
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Table 9 
Additional Effect of Connections through either the Same Office or Audit Committee 
Panel A. Restatement Analyses 
 (1)  (2) 
 Restatement  DecRestatement 
Variable Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) 2.299 0.001***   2.534 0.001*** 
Post * Treat (Others) 0.456 0.621  0.657 0.484 
Control Variables Yes  Yes 
N 1,352   1,308  
Pseudo-R2 0.198  0.196 
Wald test: Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) = Post * Treat (Others) 
Difference in coefficient (P-value) 1.843  (0.067)*  1.877  (0.063)* 
            
Panel B. Meet/Beat Earnings Benchmark Analyses 
 (1)  (2) 
 MeetConsensus  MeetZero 
Variable Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) 3.151 0.001***   1.004 0.071* 
Post * Treat (Others) -0.281 0.876  1.390 0.065* 
Control Variables Yes  Yes 
N 472   1,352  
Pseudo-R2 0.213  0.132 
Wald test: Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) = Post * Treat (Others) 
Difference in coefficient (P-value) 3.431  (0.071)*  -0.387  (0.674)  
            
Panel C. Discretionary Accruals Analyses 
 (1)  (2) 
 |PMJDA|  |JDA| 
Variable Coeff. P-value   Coeff. P-value 
Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) 0.016 0.119   0.014 0.227 
Post * Treat (Others) 0.014 0.324  0.024 0.102 
Control Variables Yes  Yes 
N 1,044   1,044  
Adjusted R2 0.096  0.094 
Wald test: Post * Treat (Same Off or AC) = Post * Treat (Others) 
Difference in coefficient (P-value) 0.002  (0.905)   -0.010  (0.545)  
This table reports regression results of audit quality proxies on hiring auditors connected through either the same office 
or CEO/CFOs’ AC membership in connected firms. Treat (Same Off or AC) is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
firm switches to a connected auditor through either the same audit office or AC membership, and zero otherwise. Treat 
(Others) is an indicator variable equal to one if Treat is equal to one and Treat (Same Off or AC) is equal to zero, and 
zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable equal to one for the periods subsequent to auditor change, and zero otherwise. 
*, **, *** statistically different from zero (two-tailed) at the <0.10, <0.05, and <0.01 levels, respectively. P-values are 
calculated using firm-clustered standard errors. Variable definitions are included in the Appendix. 
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Table 10 
Comparison of audit fee metrics 
 
  
Hiring a  
connected auditor 
Hiring a  
non-connected auditor 
Diff. p-value   N Mean N Mean 
Panel A. Home firms       
Changes in log (audit fees) 93 0.228 150 0.114 0.114 0.167 
Changes in abnormal audit fees 89 0.002 151 -0.127 0.129 0.047** 
Changes in log (total fees) 93 0.202 156 0.076 0.126 0.075* 
Changes in abnormal total fees 89 -0.010 157 -0.137 0.127 0.028** 
       
Panel B. Connected firms 
Changes in log (audit fees) 88 0.281 162 0.145 0.136 0.057* 
Changes in abnormal audit fees 79 0.088 163 0.006 0.082 0.099* 
Changes in log (total fees) 88 0.253 168 0.065 0.188 0.007*** 
Changes in abnormal total fees 79 0.076 149 -0.034 0.110 0.023** 
This table reports results for univariate comparison of changes in fee metrics. Panel A compares the changes for home 
firms hiring a connected auditor with those for firms hiring a non-connected auditor. Panel B compares the changes for 
connected firms whose home firms hire a connected auditor with those whose home firms hire a non-connected auditor. 
*, **, *** statistically different from zero (two-tailed) at the <0.10, <0.05, and <0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
